Production complementarities and flexibility in a model of entrepreneurship by Yurdagul, Emircan
This is a postprint version of the following published document: 
Yurdagul, E. (2017). Production complementarities and flexibility in a 
model of entrepreneurship. Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 86, n. 4, 
pp. 36-51. Available in  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2017.01.002. 
© Elsevier 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. 
E-mProduction complementarities and ﬂexibility in a model
of entrepreneurship
Emircan Yurdagul
Dept. of Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid, 126, Getafe, Spainn work
 comp
es in 
sisten
ing ho
ion.Keywords:
Entrepreneurship
Labor supply
Production
Income distribution
a b s t r a c t
The focus of this paper is the ﬂexibility i
and entrepreneurs, which arise due to
ﬂexibility in hours desirable. Differenc
persistence, dispersion) and income (per
occupation speciﬁc distributions of work
workweek restrictions and income taxatail address: eyurdagu@eco.uc3m.esing hours as a motive for entrepreneurship. The model exhibits inﬂexibilities for workers 
lementarities in production. In addition, it allows for volatile value of leisure to make 
occupation speciﬁc ﬂexibility, disciplined with the observed patterns in hours (level, 
ce, dispersion), can explain relatively low income levels of entrepreneurs in the US and the 
urs and income. Policy relevance of the model features is discussed using experiments of 1. Introduction
Factors affecting the selection into entrepreneurship determine the observed characteristics of ﬁrm owners, hence,
change the productivity and output patterns of their ﬁrms (e.g. levels, volatility). Moreover, entrepreneurs are potential
workers and this gives a direct link between entrepreneurship and the size of the labor force available for employment.
Accordingly, identifying the motives for entrepreneurship and capturing the economic mechanisms underlying these
motives are important for studying the ﬁrm level and aggregate productivity patterns, as well as the aggregate labor in the
economy.
Standard macroeconomic theory on entrepreneurship treats the choice between salaried work and entrepreneurship
mainly as a matter of productivity. In the seminal work by Lucas (1978), agents consider their relative ability of running a
ﬁrm over being a worker and they become entrepreneurs if its pecuniary beneﬁts are high enough. This model has been
improved with features such as ﬁnancial constraints and volatility in occupation speciﬁc ability to better match the patterns
observed in the data including the wealth and income distribution (Buera and Shin, 2013; Cagetti and de Nardi, 2006;
Midrigan and Xu, 2014).
Nevertheless, this line of research neglects the observed income differentials between entrepreneurs and workers.
Hamilton (2000) shows that entrepreneurs generate less income than comparable workers. This is also true for any tenure
in business, so that switching to salaried work at any time of entrepreneurship would make most business owners better off
income wise. This feature in the data has brought attention to the non pecuniary beneﬁts associated with entrepreneurship.
For instance, Hurst and Pugsley (2011) use survey data on business owners to show that the majority of entrepreneurs list
non pecuniary reasons such as ﬂexible hours or preferring to be their own boss for starting their businesses. In another
recent paper, Pugsley (2011) uses an innate preference for entrepreneurship to explain the observed income differentials.1
Recognizing the role of non pecuniary motives in entrepreneurship is important, but a structural model that highlights the
mechanisms accounting for such motives is still missing. In turn, this has prevented the literature from disciplining the
explanations with the observed micro patterns other than the income differentials.
My objective in this paper is to ﬁll this gap by focusing on the ﬂexible hours motive for entrepreneurship, as this is
one motive that can potentially be quantiﬁed using data on hours by workers and entrepreneurs. The empirical
evidence provided here documents that the patterns of hours of entrepreneurs are different from those of workers. In
the cross section, working hours are more disperse for entrepreneurs than they are for workers. The distribution of
changes in hours are more concentrated around zero for workers than they are for entrepreneurs. Moreover, workers
with hours close to the usual hours in their sectors tend to earn more per hour, which is a pattern that seems missing
for entrepreneurs.
Departing from the highlighted facts, the question that follows is: Is the ﬂexible hours motive, disciplined with the
observed occupation speciﬁc patterns in hours (level, persistence, dispersion) and income (persistence, dispersion), strong
enough to generate the observed differentials in income levels? In order to answer this question, I add two features to a
standard entrepreneurship model. First feature is the shocks to the value of leisure in a fashion used in the literature in
various contexts.1 Deﬁning ﬂexibility as the ability to change hours without sacriﬁcing hourly income, volatile value of
leisure creates a preference for ﬂexibility. The second is a labor aggregation technology that exhibits complementarities
between hours of workers. This novel feature makes workers more productive if their hours are similar to each other. Hence,
it makes wages depend on the hours of work and get particularly low for those working too little or too much, consistently
with the observed hump shaped pattern of workers' hourly income across their working hours. As a result of such an
endogenous cost of deviating from the “usual” hours in the economy, the preference for ﬂexibility manifests itself as a
preference for entrepreneurship.
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) is used to calibrate the model for the US. The model can generate
the income differentials between workers and entrepreneurs. Moreover it gives a good ﬁt for other untargeted moments
such as income and hours distribution among entrepreneurs and workers.
In order to show the quantitative importance of the key features, I compare the model's performance with that of two
standard alternatives that ignore worker complementarity and value of leisure volatility. The complete ﬂexibility arising in
the absence of complementarities creates a dispersion in workers' hours that is more than 50 percent larger than the data.
The resulting lack of the ﬂexibility motive for entrepreneurship generates counterfactually high average income for
entrepreneurs. On the other hand, omitting the value of leisure shocks takes out an important source of hours variation from
the model. The productivity shocks alone, calibrated to match the income dispersion for workers and entrepreneurs, can
only generate half of the dispersion observed in hours for these occupations.
The benchmark economy has many workers ﬁnding it hard to keep up with the long hours of their peers. There are also
individuals that have become entrepreneurs only to avoid the working hours that are too long for their value of leisure.
Accordingly, policies leading to modest reductions in the working hours can help these people. This paper gives two
examples, workweek restrictions and labor income taxation, to elaborate this quantitatively.
The inability of workers to choose their working hours without sacriﬁcing hourly income has been documented
empirically. Dickens and Lundberg (1993) use the Current Population Survey to show that 35 percent of male workers
in the US would like to change their hours, and 28 percent would like to increase their hours given hourly wage.
Stewart and Swafﬁeld (1997) and Boheim and Taylor (2004) reach similar conclusions using datasets on UK workers.
Altonji and Paxson (1988) show that there is a premium for working an undesirable amount of hours. They argue that
ﬁrms have strong preferences for hours worked and that there is a ﬁxed hours phenomenon. Aaronson and French
(2004) use the social security rules in the US to identify the link between hours and hourly wage. They ﬁnd that there
is a signiﬁcant wage penalty for switching to part time work from full time work for men. Moreover, they argue that
the models ignoring the nonlinear link between hours and wages are bound to underestimate the effects of income
taxation on labor supply. Rogerson (2011) surveys the literature documenting the inﬂexibilities in labor supply, as
well as the studies that exogenously introduce these inﬂexibilities to a standard labor supply model. He also extends a
standard model by an exogenously given non linear wage rate. The way inﬂexibilities in hours arise here is close to
this feature of Rogerson (2011). Importantly, my model presents an underlying mechanism to generate the non linear
wage scheme.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides evidence from the US suggesting that volatile preferences and
inﬂexible hours can be playing a role in individuals' decision of entrepreneurship. Section 3 introduces the benchmark
model. Section 4 explains the calibration and Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 discusses the role of the main
features of the benchmark model and their relevance for policy. Section 7 concludes.1 For instance, Erosa et al. (2016) show that such heterogeneities in the value of leisure are key in understanding the labor supply elasticities of
workers. Aaronson and French (2004) also use value of leisure shocks to capture the observed variations for workers.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of income, hours, changes in hours (data). Note: Hours and hourly income are conditional on sex, race, disability, education, potential
job experience, year dummies and the interactions between these variables. (This is also true for the rest of the ﬁgures.)2. Empirical evidence
The objective of this section is to use the SIPP to clarify the motivation of the paper. The SIPP provides micro level panel
data, with an interval of four months between waves and with around ten waves within each panel. In addition to standard
characteristics such as sex, race, disability and education, it collects information about occupation, hours, and income.
In order to condition out the factors that are not features of my model, I ﬁrst regress hours and hourly income on sex,
race, disability, education, potential job experience, year dummies and the interactions between these variables. Then the
residuals are adjusted to have the minimum in the sample equal to 0 and the mean equal to that of the corresponding
dependent variable. This gives the measures of conditional hours and hourly income (hence the total income) that will be
used for the rest of the paper.
For business owners, the SIPP includes information on the size category of the ﬁrm, where these categories are 0 24, 25
99 and 100þ . My sample excludes entrepreneurs in the largest category for two reasons. A focus here is hours worked by
entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, at the top of the ﬁrm size distribution, the ownership structure of a ﬁrm gets less clear, hence
the weight of the entrepreneurial input in the production technology would differ. Moreover, the returns to scale that these
very large ﬁrms exhibit would be larger than the smaller ones.2 The Online Appendix provides further details on the data
and the summary statistics for the sample.
Panel A of Fig. 1 shows the distribution of income and hours separately for entrepreneurs and workers. The income of
entrepreneurs is more disperse than that of workers. Entrepreneurs in the sample earn less than workers on average. Hours
worked by the two occupational groups also exhibit different patterns. To begin with, an average entrepreneur works more
than an average worker. Similar to their income, entrepreneurs' working hours also vary more in the cross section and have
fatter tails than workers' hours.
Working hours in the two occupations are different also in volatility. Panel B of Fig. 1 ﬁrst depicts the changes in hours
worked by people who have the same occupation in two consecutive periods. The hours by entrepreneurs are more volatile.2 The quantitative analysis in this paper revisits this discussion with the estimation of the span-of-control for the ﬁrms in the data. Another note is that
the probability of an entrepreneur that employs less than or equal to 99 to employ more than that next period conditional on continuing to be an
entrepreneur is 0.31 percent. The probability of the switch in the other direction is 21 percent.
3
Interestingly, the patterns in levels and differences of hours are the same if we look at hours, once controlled by the hourly
income, as the second ﬁgure in Panel B documents.3
One candidate mechanism making the working hours less volatile and more concentrated around the mean for workers
would be complementarities between their hours. In particular, if complementarities between hours of workers in a pro
duction unit are stronger than those between workers and their employers, the hourly premium for working usual hours
will be higher for workers. While we do not observe the distribution of hours and wages within the production units of
workers, the SIPP provides information on their detailed sectors and education levels. If the skills of workers (measured by
education) proxy their production units, and the distributions of hours and wages within each sector resemble those within
a typical unit it has, the hours wages relationship within sectors for different education groups can be informative in the
presence of complementarities in labor aggregation.
The next exercise splits the sample into two education groups and shows that within each sector (i) the wages of workers
peak at the hours close to what an average worker works, and decrease towards extremely high and low working hours, (ii)
these patterns contrast with the much more monotone hours hourly income relationship of entrepreneurs.4 Education
groups divide the sample as individuals with and without a college degree. In order to illustrate the hours wages rela
tionship for each group in a simple ﬁgure while controlling for the differences between sectors, Panel A of Fig. 2 plots the
difference between workers' hourly income and the average in their sector (wij wj, where i denotes a worker, j is her sector
and hourly incomes are normalized to have average among all workers equal to unity) against the difference between their
working hours and the average in the sector (lij lj). The ﬁgure shows that hourly income relative to a worker's sector
indeed peaks close to the usual hours, and decreases monotonically with the distance from the wage maximizing hours.
An alternative way of looking into the same pattern is to do a similar exercise for each sector separately. For this purpose,
Panel B of Fig. 2 groups the detailed sectors for workers into fewer categories. There are different ways of doing this
categorization, and the strategy here is to follow the industry grouping available in the SIPP for entrepreneurs in order to
allow comparison later on. The ﬁgure shows hourly income across deviations from the hours of the mean worker in every
industry category. For each of these 12 categories, there is a hump shaped pattern in the hourly income for workers from
both educational groups.
Panel B of Fig. 2 also documents that the patterns for entrepreneurs are quite different from those for workers. In
particular, their hourly income typically does not exhibit a peak in intermediary ranges of working hours spectrum. Instead,
entrepreneurs' hourly income follows a monotone pattern, either increasing or decreasing, with respect to their hours for
most sectors and education groups.5
Certainly, the take away from this exercise is not that entrepreneurs are not complementary to their workers, or that
they are more ﬂexible. Instead, Fig. 2 suggests that complementarities between workers can be different from those
between entrepreneurs and workers. In turn, the ﬂexibilities permitted by the aggregation technologies in production can
potentially be different for workers than entrepreneurs.6
In order to quantify further the differences in the volatility of hours by the two occupational groups, I next run simple
OLS regressions with the absolute changes in hours as the dependent variable in a sample of people that keep their
occupation between two consecutive waves. As shown in Table 1, only including the dummy variable for entrepreneurship
gives signiﬁcantly positive effects on the absolute changes in hours. This also holds when the characteristics used earlier to
get the conditional measures of hours and hourly income are included in the estimations. As the distributional differences
between the changes of working hours before and after controlling for hourly income are minimal (Panel B of Fig. 1), it is
useful to repeat the estimations in column 2, by also conditioning on the changes in the hourly income, to see that the
driving force in the changes in working hours is not only the changes in productivity. Column 3 shows that the larger
differences for entrepreneurs are robust to controlling for the changes in productivity.7 This suggests that there is some
other mechanism leading to differences in hours that does not have much to do with pecuniary returns to working.
An important factor in the observed changes in hours can be shocks to the value of leisure. Correspondingly, it is
worthwhile to come up with some measures in the data to capture these shocks to see (i) how signiﬁcantly they change the
hours worked by people, and in turn (ii) how big of a role they play in switches to entrepreneurship. Next, two different
variables are introduced to proxy the arrival of shocks on the value of leisure: absolute changes in the family size and a
change in the marital status.3 A Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test rejects the null hypothesis that the distribution for entrepreneurs is the same with that workers at the 1 percent
level for all comparisons in Fig. 1. To be speciﬁc, the implied D-statistic is 0.24 for the distributions of income, and 0.18 for the hours. It is 0.14 for the
distribution of changes in hours and 0.13 for that of the residual hours.
4 I would like to thank the referee for encouraging me to perform this exercise.
5 The Online Appendix shows that the ﬁndings are similar if we repeat the exercises depicted in Fig. 2 for the entire sample instead of conditioning on
educational status.
6 Clearly, Fig. 2 can be explained by alternative theories. One explanation can be that the unobserved ability is lower for workers with extreme hours.
However, it would require a non-trivial argument to generate (i) hump-shaped relationship in ability and observed working hours for workers, (ii)
observed differences between workers and entrepreneurs, with unobserved ability levels.
7 Focusing on people that are workers or entrepreneurs for two consecutive periods can create a sample selection issue, as job-stayers are more likely
to be receiving positive occupation speciﬁc shocks. Running these regressions separately for negative and positive changes in hours, in order to mitigate the
selection issue give similar results. Moreover, controlling for the job categories also makes little difference.
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Fig. 2. Working hours and wages within each sector. Note: Figures in Panel A plot the Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing of hourly income
against the levels of hours (both differences from sector mean). Figures in Panel B plot that of hourly income across the levels of difference in hours from
the mean worker in each sector. Plotted around the curves are the conﬁdence intervals at 95 percent level. The initial levels of hourly income are
normalized to have an overall average of 1 for workers. Figure (a) uses individuals without a college degree and (b) uses college degrees and above.Changes in the family size can capture the arrival of a child, which would have an impact on the value of leisure of the
parents. It can also indicate the death of a family member, hence the presence of an individual in the family with critical
health condition between two waves requiring time allocated for health care. Changes in the marital status can account for
the changes in the value of leisure in the ﬁrst few months in a new marriage or in the adjustment period to the single life. In
order to see if these variables have explanatory power on the changes in hours, the OLS estimations in Table 1 with changes
in hours as the dependent variable continue by including the changes in the family demographics as independent variables.
Column 4 adds the absolute change in the family size as the independent variable, and shows that the coefﬁcient for this
variable is positive and signiﬁcant. Column 5 does the same for the change of the marital status and obtains qualitatively
similar results. Finally, column 6 uses both proxy variables for the preference shocks in the same estimation. Notice that the
coefﬁcients for both variables are signiﬁcantly positive.
According to the mechanism pursued here, variables necessitating a change in the hours worked would make ﬂexible
hours hence entrepreneurship more desirable. In order to see the plausibility of this logic, I regress the switch to
entrepreneurship on the previous proxies for the shocks on the value of leisure. These estimations also include the char
acteristics as in the previous tables, as well as the lagged hourly income in order to control for possible productivity shocks
workers might receive. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show that the absolute changes in the family size and in the marital
status have signiﬁcant positive effects on switches to entrepreneurship when they are included separately in the5
Table 1
Estimation of change in hours worked.
Variables Dependent variable: Absolute change in fraction of hours worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entrepreneur 0.0190nnn 0.0185nnn 0.0175nnn 0.0176nnn 0.0175nnn 0.0176nnn
(158.3) (153.3) (146.9) (147.0) (146.8) (147.0)
Hourly income ch. 0.000388nnn
0.000387nnn 0.000387nnn
0.000387nnn
(167.1) (166.9) (167.0) (166.9)
Ch. in family size 0.00254nnn 0.00229nnn
(32.15) (27.54)
Ch. in marital status 0.00563nnn 0.00294nnn
(19.10) (9.476)
Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.0177nnn 0.00837 0.00585 0.00670 0.00611 0.00675
(502.9) (0.491) (0.348) (0.399) (0.363) (0.402)
Observations 1,008,003 1,008,003 1,008,003 1,007,767 1,007,767 1,007,767
R2 0.024 0.038 0.064 0.065 0.064 0.065
Note: The sample consists of individuals that keep being an entrepreneur or being a worker since the previous wave. Except the estimation in (1),
explanatory variables also include sex, race, disability, education, potential job experience, year dummies and the interactions between these variables.
Hourly income change is the absolute change in the ratio of monthly income to usual hours worked. The change in the family size is absolute change in the
number of persons in the family relative to previous period. The change in the marital status is the absolute change in the marriage indicator.
t-Statistics in parentheses.
*** indicate signiﬁcance at 1 percent level.regressions.8 Column 3 shows that the effects of the two proxies are also signiﬁcantly positive if they are both included as
explanatory variables in the regression. Finally, including a dummy variable for having an entrepreneurship experience in
the previous waves does not reduce the signiﬁcance of the demographic variables.
Though not conclusive, evidence in this section supports the ﬁndings in the literature in three ways. First, a typical
entrepreneur earns less than a typical worker. Second, entrepreneurs work more on average. Third, workers' hours are not
as disperse as they are for entrepreneurs, and they do not move as much between periods, which potentially hints that
workers are more constrained in hours. In fact, different from entrepreneurs, the hourly income of workers seem to exhibit a
premium to working close to usual hours in a sector. Finally, the changes in the value of leisure, proxied by the changes in
the household demographics, have signiﬁcant explanatory power in changes in hours and in switches to entrepreneurship.
The next section introduces the model, which presents a realistic modiﬁcation of a standard entrepreneurship model in
order to account for the facts illustrated above.3. Model
The description of the setting starts from the production technology of the ﬁrms, and then goes over the details of the
household side of the economy.3.1. Firms
Production of all the ﬁrms in the economy can be represented by Ym ¼ Zm KαmL1αm
  ~ηm
; where m is the index of the ﬁrm,
Km denotes capital, Lm is the effective external labor and Zm is the efﬁciency of these two factors. ~ηm governs the returns to
scale in the production and it is potentially different across ﬁrms. Effective labor of a ﬁrm is an aggregation across units
consisting of workers with different skill levels, Lm ¼
R1
0 yLmðyÞdy; where Lm(y) denotes the aggregate hours of work by skill
group y at ﬁrm m. In the aggregation technology, there are potential complementarities between hours of workers:
LmðyÞ ¼
Z
iANmð yÞ
lρi di
 1
ρ
Z
iANmð yÞ
1di
 1 1ρ
; ð1Þ8 Instead of the magnitude of the change, using the indicator of a change in the family size or using increases and decreases separately make little
difference. Moreover, introducing all the interactions between the characteristics used in these estimations does not make a big difference, neither in the
explanatory power of the model nor in the signiﬁcance of the independent variable of interest. Omitting the previous hourly income and the characteristics
in these estimations do not give very different results in terms of the coefﬁcients of the demographic variables, but reduce R2 of these estimations.
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Table 2
Estimation of switching to entrepreneurship, using changes in demographics.
Variables Dependent variable: Indicator of becoming an entrepreneur
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change in family size 0.00428nnn 0.00353nnn 0.00354nnn
(23.46) (18.37) (18.48)
Change in marital status 0.0129nnn 0.00877nnn 0.00872nnn
(19.06) (12.27) (12.26)
Entr, hist 0.0397nnn
(89.82)
Constant 0.123nnn 0.124nnn 0.123nnn 0.124nnn
(3.352) (3.375) (3.347) (3.384)
Observations 927,367 927,367 927,367 927,367
R2 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.017
Note: The sample consists of individuals that were workers in the previous period. For the estimations, linear probability model is used. Dependent variable
is the indicator of becoming an entrepreneur. Characteristics that are controlled for are sex, race, disability, education, potential job experience, year
dummies and the interactions between these variables. Current and previous hourly income level is also included among the controls. The change in the
family size is absolute change in the number of persons in the family relative to previous period. The change in the marital status is the absolute change in
the marriage indicator.
t-Statistics in parentheses.
*** indicate signiﬁcance at 1 percent level.where Nm(y) is the set of workers with skill y at ﬁrmm, and fligiANmðyÞ is their hours worked. In order to abstract from indices
of workers, one can rewrite the aggregation in terms of measure of workers employed with each level of hours worked:
LmðyÞ ¼
Z 1
0
μmðl; yÞlρdl
!1
ρ Z 1
0
μmðl; yÞdl
 !1 1ρ
; ð2Þ
where μmðl; yÞ is the measure of workers with skill y, working l hours for ﬁrm m.
3.2. Consumers
There is a continuum of inﬁnitely living agents with unit mass. Preferences are given by:
X1
t 0
βt
c1γit
1 γ
vit
l1þϕit
1þϕ
" #
: ð3Þ
For all individuals, the value of leisure evolves with the process9:
logvit ¼ ð1 πvÞlogðv0Þþπvlogvit1þξit ; ξit Nð0;σvÞ: ð4Þ
An individual can be a worker or an entrepreneur. Entrepreneurial ability, Ait, follows:
logAit ¼ ð1 πAÞlogA0þπAlogAit1þζit ; ζit Nð0;σAÞ: ð5Þ
Skill level of a worker also evolves stochastically with process:
logyit ¼ πylogyit1þϵit ; ϵit Nð0;σyÞ; ð6Þ
and variables ξit, ζit and ϵit are drawn independently from each other.
Any individual in the economy can become a worker at any time. However workers are free to start their businesses only
with probability sA ð0;1: This assumption captures the stochastic nature of the arrival of opportunities for
entrepreneurship.
Consumers pay income taxes at a ﬂat rate τ, and receive lump sum transfers T. Taxable income consists of labor earnings
and interests earned on risk free bonds.10
Consumers' problem: The value function of an individual with wealth a, ability levels A and y, and the disutility variable v,
if she can freely choose the occupation this period, is
Vða;A; y; vÞ ¼maxfVeða;A; y; vÞ;Vwða;A; y; vÞg; ð7Þ
where Ve is the value of being an entrepreneur and Vw is the value of being a worker. Entrepreneurs choose their savings, a0;
consumption, c; supply of labor to their ﬁrms, h; the capital to be rented for their ﬁrms, K; and measure of workers with skill9 The Online Appendix includes an extension that allows for heterogeneities in the value of leisure volatility.
10 The Online Appendix discusses the reasoning behind the assumption of a ﬂat rate and the implications of using progressive taxation instead of the
ﬂat tax rate in the main computations of the paper.
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level y to work l hours. The value function of an entrepreneur is:
Veða;A; y; vÞ ¼ max
c;h;a0 ;K;μðl;yÞ
c1 γ
1 γ
v
h1þϕ
1þϕþβE½Vða
0;A0; y0; v0ÞjA; y; v ð8Þ
s:t: cþa0 ¼Πþað1þrÞ τðΠþarÞþT ð9Þ
Π ¼ Y KðrþδÞ
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
wðl; yÞμðl; yÞldldy ð10Þ
Y ¼ Ahω Kα
Z 1
0
μðl; yÞlρdl
 !1
ρ Z 1
0
μðl; yÞdl
 !1 1ρ24
3
5
1α0B@
1
CA
η
ð11Þ
cZ0; hA ½0;1; a0Z0; KZ0; μðl; yÞZ0 8 lA ½0;1: ð12Þ
Workers make decisions on their savings and labor supply. Their value function is:
Vwða;A; y; vÞ ¼max
c;l;a0
c1γ
1 γ
v
l1þϕ
1þϕþβE½sVða
0;A0; y0; v0Þþð1 sÞVwða0;A0; y0; v0ÞjA; y; v
s:t:cþa0 ¼wðl; yÞlþað1þrÞ τðwðl; yÞlþarÞþT
cZ0; lA ½0;1; a0Z0:
The value of the consumer that was a worker last period and did not receive a business opportunity this period is simply
Vwða;A; y; vÞ.
The optimal consumption, assets and labor supply if the consumer has the opportunity to be an entrepreneur (keep
being an entrepreneur or switch to become one) are cOða;A; y; vÞ, aOða;A; y; vÞ and lOða;A; y; vÞ, respectively. If the consumer
has to be a worker, the policy functions are cNða;A; y; vÞ, aNða;A; y; vÞ and lNða;A; y; vÞ: The indicator of choosing entrepre
neurship over being a worker in case of having an opportunity is Sða;A; y; vÞ. Policies for capital and the labor measure for
entrepreneurs are Knða;A; y; vÞ and μnðl; y; a;A; y; vÞ.
Non entrepreneurial sector's problem: Non entrepreneurial ﬁrms' problem is static. They choose howmuch capital to rent,
K; the measure of workers with skill level y to work l hours; and their total output, Y. To be speciﬁc, their maximization
problem reads:
max
K ;μ
Y ðrþδÞK
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
wðl; yÞμðl; yÞldldy ð13Þ
s:t: Y ¼ BKα
Z 1
0
μðl; yÞlρdl
 !1
ρ Z 1
0
μðl; yÞdl
 !1 1ρ24
3
5
1α
: ð14Þ
The optimal capital and the measure of labor are denoted by Kb and μbðl; yÞ, respectively.
Stationary equilibrium: A stationary equilibrium is an allocation Kb;μbðl; yÞ;Knða;A; y; vÞ, μnðl; y; a;A; y; vÞ, ciða;A; y; vÞ;
aiða;A; y; vÞ; liða;A; y; vÞ for iAfN;Og; Sða;A; y; vÞ, prices r, wðl; yÞ, and time invariant distribution φða;A; v; JÞ over wealth (a),
entrepreneurial productivity (A), worker skill (y), value of leisure (v) and occupation (J) such that:
(i) Policy functions solve the problems of consumers.
(ii) Kb and μb solve the problem of the non entrepreneurial sector.
(iii) Asset markets clear. The total capital used by the non entrepreneurial sector and the entrepreneurial sector is equal to
the total wealth in the economy.
(iv) Labor markets clear. Total measure of workers demanded by all ﬁrms for each level of productivity y and working hours
lA ½0;1 is equal to the corresponding labor supply.
(v) Government budget is balanced. Total tax revenues equal total lump sum transfers.
Discussion on ﬂexibility in salaried work: The model does not allow a fully analytical characterization of the equilibrium.
Nevertheless, one can derive the equations for wages to illustrate a worker's trade off between wages and hours. While the
solution of ﬁrms' proﬁt maximization problem is left to the Online Appendix, an important implication of this solution is
that the wages depend on hours of work. In particular, equilibrium wages satisfy:
wðl; yÞ ¼ ð1 αÞ α
rþδ
  α1 α
yEx ;yðlρÞ
1
ρ
1
ρ
lρ1
Ex ;y l
ρ þ 1 1ρ
 
l1
" #
; ð15Þ8
where
Ex ;yðlρÞ ¼
R 1
0 xðl; yÞl
ρdlR 1
0 xðl; yÞdl
; xðl; yÞ 
Z
nAMA
μnðl; yÞdnþ
Z
bAMB
μbðl; yÞdb; ð16Þ
and MA and MB denote the set of entrepreneurial and non entrepreneurial ﬁrms in the economy, respectively. Eq. (15)
shows that a worker's wage depends on her hours of work relative to fellow workers with the same skill level. The max
imum hourly wage is achieved at lðyÞ ¼ Ex ;yðlρÞ
1
ρ : Wages decrease as working hours get further away from lðyÞ.
I return to this discussion once calibrating the model, and highlight these inﬂexibilities showing how the hourly incomes
change with working hours in the simulated economy.4. Calibration
In SIPP, the relevant information is updated only with each wave, hence one period in my model corresponds to four
months. Accordingly, following Cagetti and de Nardi (2006), who take the yearly depreciation rate equal to 0:06; δ is set to
0.02. The calibration follows the same paper in assuming α¼ 0:33, B¼1 and γ ¼ 1:5. The discount rate β is assumed to be
equal to 0.983 corresponding to a yearly discount factor of 0.95.
There is extensive literature estimating the elasticity of labor supply, which here is the inverse of the parameter ϕ, with
substantial differences in studies focusing on aggregates and those working on micro surveys. Here, ϕ is set equal to 2, a
value consistent with micro estimates of labor supply elasticity.
The span of control parameter for the entrepreneurial production function, η, is chosen to have the total income of
external labor in the entrepreneurial sector relative to the income of entrepreneurs equal to the one in the data. The
SIPP asks respondent about the number of workers employed by one's employer at all locations, while the answer has
to fall into categories 0 24, 25 99 or larger. The ratio of interest is that of the total income by the workers in the ﬁrst
two categories to the total income of entrepreneurs, which in this paper corresponds to employers of 99 or less. The
relative income share of workers in the entrepreneurial sector implied by the model is ð1αÞη1η . Equating two ratios
gives η¼ 0:504. This value is much lower than the standard range, which is around 0.85. The difference is due to
excluding the entrepreneurs with large businesses. Doing the same derivations in the sample that includes these big
businesses gives the span of control parameter equal to 0.94.11 This is consistent with having the non
entrepreneurial sector separately in the model, with a production function exhibiting constant returns to scale.
I approximate the stochastic processes in the model using Rouwenhorst method outlined by Kopecky and Suen
(2010). There are ﬁve grid points for the value of leisure, three points for entrepreneurial ability and two grid points for
the ability as workers. The autocorrelation of worker ability is assumed to be equal to 0.983, again following Cagetti and
de Nardi (2006).
The sample here excludes unemployment spells, owners of big businesses, and focuses on income conditional on
observable characteristics such as education. Hence, using the tax rate corresponding to the median individual for the
entire population is a natural choice in the context of this paper. Using Internal Revenue Service data from 2000, Guner
et al. (2014) estimate the average Federal tax rate to be 7 percent for the middle income quantile in the US. They also
estimate the total of state and local taxes to be at 4 percent for this quantile. Accordingly, τ is set equal to 11 percent. The
Online Appendix introduces an extension of the benchmark model with progressive taxation schemes following the
estimations in the literature and shows that such more sophisticated tax regimes do not affect the qualitative results in
this paper.
The rest of the parameters are calibrated jointly, though each of these is set targeting one directly related moment.
Parameters ρ, σv, ω, v0, A0, πA, πv, σA, σy, and s are calibrated to match dispersion in hours of workers and entre
preneurs, average hours worked by entrepreneurs and workers, number of entrepreneurs, persistence of income and
hours for entrepreneurs, dispersion of income for entrepreneurs and workers, and the fraction of population
switching from entrepreneurs to workers, respectively. Table 3 summarizes the values of parameters and the
moments they target.
The two key features of the model are complementarities in the labor aggregation and the value of leisure volatility. Hence, it
is important to highlight the identiﬁcation of the parameters dictating the severity of these features, namely ρ and σv, respec
tively. Higher volatility in the value of leisure (larger σv) implies more dispersion in hours of workers and entrepreneurs.
Meanwhile, higher complementarities (lower ρ) imply less ﬂexibility, hence less dispersion, in workers' hours. Accordingly, σv is
set to match the hours dispersion (standard deviation in logs) for entrepreneurs, and ρ is chosen to match the hours dispersion
for workers, given σv and the rest of the parameters. In other words, dispersion in entrepreneurs' hours is the discipline for the
magnitude of the value of leisure shocks. Given this magnitude, ρ is set to match the dispersion in workers' hours.11 Midrigan and Xu (2014) assume the span-of-control parameter to be equal to 0.85. Buera et al. (2011) calibrate it to be 0.79, whereas Cagetti and de
Nardi (2006) use 0.88.
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Table 3
Parameters.
Parameter Value Basis
Panel A: Literature or data directly
α 0.330 Cagetti and de Nardi (2006)
δ 0.020 Cagetti and de Nardi (2006)
β 0.983 Cagetti and de Nardi (2006)
γ 1.5 Cagetti and de Nardi (2006)
B 1 Cagetti and de Nardi (2006)
πy 0.983 Cagetti and de Nardi (2006)
τ 0.11 Guner et al. (2014)
ϕ 2 Inverse of labor supply elasticity
η 0.504 See text
Panel B: Calibrated
A0 2.627 Fraction of entrepreneurs
ρ 0.020 Sd of log-hours (worker)
σv 0.533 Sd of log-hours (entr)
σA 0.105 Sd of log-income (entr)
σy 0.043 Sd of log-income (worker)
πv 0.641 Persistence of log-hours (entr)
πA 0.786 Persistence of log-income (entr)
v0 78 Hours (worker, mean)
ω 0.557 Hours (entr, mean)
s 0.010 Population switching to workerThe calibrated substitutability parameter ρ is equal to 0.02. This means that the model would overshoot (undershoot) the
dispersion in workers' hours for a ρ larger (smaller) than 0.02, either keeping the rest of the parameters the same or
recalibrating them to match their corresponding targets. The same holds for the variance of the value of leisure shocks, σv,
which is calibrated to be 0.533. As σv is decreased (increased) around the benchmark calibration, the model would imply a
dispersion in entrepreneurs' hours that is lower (higher) than the data. This is true not only if the rest of the parameters
remain constant, but also when they are reset to keep ﬁtting their targets.
Later, Section 6 will discuss the role of the model features by comparing the benchmark with two alternatives: one with
no complementarities (ρ¼ 1) and one with no value of leisure volatility (σv ¼ 0). Meanwhile, the Online Appendix includes
a more thorough documentation of the sensitivity of their target moments to ρ and σv.5. Results
This section presents the main results. Table 4 compares the data and the model counterparts of the targeted moments in
Panel A, and some untargeted ones in Panel B. The model ﬁts the targeted moments completely. There are equally many
entrepreneurs in the model as there are in the data, which is around 9 percent of the overall population. Entrepreneurs
work slightly more than workers on average. The rate of occupational switch is around 0.5 percent. The model also matches
the patterns of dispersion of income and working hours for both occupations. In particular, the cross sectional variation in
income is around 95 percent higher for entrepreneurs than it is for workers; and for hours this margin is around 74 percent.
Model implied persistence for income and hours for entrepreneurs also ﬁts those in the data.
Next, I turn to the model's ﬁt to the untargeted moments. The model can match the level differences in income between
the two occupations closely. The average entrepreneur earns around 6 percent less than the average worker, both in the
model and the data. Relative income of entrepreneurs is smaller, if one compares the medians instead of the means; both in
the model and in the data. The median entrepreneur earns 14 percent less in the data, and 16 percent less in the model, than
the median worker. The ratio of entrepreneurs earning more than the median worker is 36 percent in the data and 40
percent in the model. In addition, the model generates for workers an autocorrelation of log income at 0.81 and the
autocorrelation of log hours at 0.66, as they are in the data.
Evidence in Section 2 showed that the patterns of changes in hours in the data do not differ substantially if one looks at
the hours controlled by productivity of an individual; and the corresponding discussion argued that this is because a sig
niﬁcant portion of the changes in hours are preference driven. (See Panel B of Fig. 1.) The next exercise computes in the
model the mean absolute change in hours by agents with the same occupation two consecutive periods. Then it constructs
the same change in residual hours, once controlled for hourly income. Table 4 shows that, both for entrepreneurs and
workers, the differences in these means are very similar before and after controlling for the productivity. For entrepreneurs,
the mean absolute changes in hours before and after controlling hours by hourly income are 0.053 and 0.051, respectively.
For workers these are equal to 0.030 for both measures. Importantly, these patterns resemble the corresponding feature in
the data, where the mean changes in hours stay around 0.037 for entrepreneurs and 0.018 for workers after controlling by10
Low productivity High productivity
Fig. 3. Working hours and wages across productivity levels (model). Note: The initial levels of hourly income are normalized to have an overall average of
1 for workers. The left (right) ﬁgure uses workers with lower (higher) worker productivity and entrepreneurs with middle (higher) entrepreneurial
productivity. Left (right) ﬁgure plots the Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing of hourly income across the levels of difference in hours from the
mean worker with low (high) productivity. Conﬁdence intervals are omitted as there is no further variation in hourly incomes given hours and productivity
levels.
Table 4
Summary of results.
Moment Data Model
Panel A: Targeted
Fraction of entr 0.088 0.088
Hours (entr, mean) 0.243 0.242
Hours (worker, mean) 0.239 0.239
Sd of log-inc (entr) 0.658 0.655
Sd of log-inc (worker) 0.336 0.336
Sd of log-hours (entr) 0.405 0.404
Sd of log-hours (worker) 0.234 0.232
Autocorr of log-inc (entr) 0.746 0.746
Autocorr of log-hours (entr) 0.694 0.694
Population switching to worker 0.005 0.005
Panel B: Untargeted
Ratio of mean income (entr/worker) 0.935 0.943
Ratio of median income (entr/worker) 0.858 0.838
Autocorr of log-inc (worker) 0.811 0.808
Autocorr of log-hours (worker) 0.661 0.660
Population switching to entr 0.004 0.005
Earning more than median worker (entr) 0.364 0.404
Absolute change in hours (entr) 0.037 0.053
Absolute change in hours (worker) 0.018 0.030
Absolute change in hours (entr, res) 0.037 0.051
Absolute change in hours (worker, res) 0.018 0.030
Note: The table documents the moments implied by the benchmark calibration. Panel A gives the comparison of the data and model in terms of the
targeted moments. Panel B gives that for some important moments not targeted in calibration. “Earning mode than median worker” is the fraction of
entrepreneurs with income above the median worker. “Absolute change in hours” is the average absolute change in the fraction of hours worked. Last two
rows, denoted by “(res)”, repeat this after controlling the fraction of hours worked by hourly income.hourly income. In addition, the model replicates the distribution of changes in hours and residual hours controlled for
hourly income very closely, and the Online Appendix includes the ﬁgures illustrating this.12
It is also worth using the model economy to illustrate the implications of complementarities in the labor aggregation on the
wage hours relationship of workers. For this purpose, Fig. 3 plots the relationship between workers' hours (in difference to the
mean worker in that productivity group) and their wage for each productivity level. In turn, this exercise is a replication of Fig. 2
using the model simulations instead of the data. The ﬁgure shows how the wages of workers in the model peak close to the
mean hours in a fashion qualitatively similar to the pattern depicted for the data. Moreover, such peak does not exist for
entrepreneurs. To show that, Fig. 3 separates the entrepreneurs with middle entrepreneurial ability (second ability grid out of12 As it is the case for the data, a KS test rejects that the model-implied distribution of changes in hours of workers is the same as that of workers at 99
percent conﬁdence level, with a D-statistic of 0.22. This is also true for the distributions of changes in hours conditional on hourly income, with a D-statistic
of 0.20.
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Table 5
Moments with alternative calibrations.
Moment Data Benchmark No comp. Stable pref.
Panel A: Targeted
Fraction of entr 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.087
Hours (entr, mean) 0.243 0.242 0.244 0.243
Hours (worker, mean) 0.239 0.239 0.239 0.239
Sd of log-inc (entr) 0.658 0.655 0.659 0.656
Sd of log-inc (worker) 0.336 0.336 0.360 0.336
Sd of log-hours (entr) 0.405 0.404 0.405 0.217
Sd of log-hours (worker) 0.234 0.232 0.360 0.097
Autocorr of log-inc (entr) 0.746 0.746 0.747 0.742
Autocorr of log-hours (entr) 0.694 0.694 0.694 0.771
Population switching to worker 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Panel B: Untargeted
Ratio of mean income (e/w) 0.935 0.943 1.192 0.901
Ratio of median income (e/w) 0.858 0.838 1.000 0.526
Autocorr of log-inc (w) 0.811 0.808 0.689 0.989
Autocorr of log-hours (w) 0.661 0.660 0.688 0.997
Earn more than med. worker (e) 0.364 0.404 0.501 0.368
Absolute change in hours (e) 0.037 0.053 0.051 0.016
Absolute change in hours (w) 0.018 0.030 0.043 0.000three in total) and those with the higher ability and repeat the similar exercise as for workers. It shows the corresponding
patterns for entrepreneurs, particularly that the hump shaped pattern of hourly income is missing for entrepreneurs, as is true
in the data. Instead, the hourly income of entrepreneurs has a monotone and increasing pattern in hours, as implied simply by
the calibrated entrepreneurial weight, ω, and the span of control, η, for their production function.13
The model performs well also in terms of the distributions of income and hours. Section 6 revisits the corresponding
discussion with a comparison of the benchmark model's implications for important distributional moments with key
alternative settings.6. Role and implications of the model features
This section consists of two quantitative exercises that aim to discuss the role of two important features of the
benchmark model. First exercise replicates the calibration exercise if the complementarities between workers' hours are
assumed away (i.e. ρ¼ 1). Second one studies the role of volatile value of leisure using a model that shuts down this aspect
of uncertainty (i.e. σv ¼ 0).
6.1. Complementarities in the labor aggregation
Complementarities between the hours of workers in the labor aggregation is a novel feature of this paper. The objective here is
to show the implications of the model if this feature is taken out, which means setting ρ equal to 1. In the benchmark exercise, the
targeted moment to calibrate ρ is the dispersion inworkers' hours. Accordingly, the calibration strategy for this setup is to replicate
the benchmark exercise with the exception of not targeting the dispersion in workers' hours. The main moments implied by this
alternative are given in Table 5, and the summary of the calibrated parameters is deferred to the Online Appendix.
In this alternative, denoted as “No complementarities”, the link between workers' hours disappears and their wages are
constant across hours. (The Online Appendix includes a replication of Fig. 3 for this setting, illustrating how the hourly
income changes with hours for both occupations.) This implies complete ﬂexibility in salaried work, hence brings coun
terfactually high dispersion in working hours for this group (by more than 50 percent). The model also worsens in its ﬁt to
the patterns of income and working hours for workers. First, the implied dispersion in income for workers, which is a
targeted moment, is higher than the data counterpart even when shutting down the variation in the underlying worker
ability completely. Second, the model performs poorly in replicating the observed persistence of income and hours, two
moments that the benchmark matches very closely, also without targeting. Finally, Table 6 shows that this model performs
worse than the benchmark in replicating the observed distributional features of income and hours for workers. Especially,
the poor ﬁt of the distribution of hours, which is of ﬁrst order relevance to ρ, is substantial.
The case of perfect substitutability is a tool to show the role of ﬂexibility related motives for entrepreneurship. By
making the dispersion and changes in hours of workers larger than what they are in the data, this modiﬁcation leaves13 Basically, having ωþη41 implies a positive relationship between hours and income of entrepreneurs given their productivity.
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Table 6
Inter-percentile ratios of income and hours.
Percentile ratio Data Benchmark No comp. Stable pref.
Panel A: Income distribution
Entrepreneurs
50/25 1.439 1.591 1.579 1.139
75/25 1.920 2.415 2.728 2.768
90/75 1.172 1.210 1.125 1.068
95/75 1.607 1.761 1.707 1.157
Workers
50/25 1.185 1.249 1.357 1.626
75/25 1.366 1.599 1.814 1.785
90/75 1.172 1.210 1.125 1.068
95/75 1.317 1.263 1.398 1.092
Panel B: Hours distribution
Entrepreneurs
50/25 1.191 1.335 1.236 1.124
75/25 1.209 1.336 1.361 1.182
90/75 1.168 1.250 1.344 1.114
95/75 1.287 1.420 1.448 1.146
Workers
50/25 1.094 1.197 1.347 1.087
75/25 1.168 1.438 1.796 1.169
90/75 1.119 1.100 1.130 1.029
95/75 1.230 1.234 1.413 1.029productivity as the major determinant of entrepreneurial decision. Hence, relative income of entrepreneurs and the fraction
earning more than the median worker is more than the benchmark and the data.
6.2. Volatile value of leisure
The next exercise studies the economy in which the value of leisure is uniform across individuals. There are two main
aspects that the calibration for this alternative would differ from the benchmark. First, the persistence and the volatility of
hours of entrepreneurs are not targeted in this alternative, as these are the targets of the benchmark calibration in setting
the persistence and volatility parameters for the value of leisure. Second, with uniform value of leisure, the model
underpredicts the dispersion for hours of workers, for any value of ρ. Hence, ρ is set at 1 to enable this alternative generate
the highest possible dispersion for workers' hours. In effect, this setting is a further deviation from the benchmark than the
previous alternative, which has volatile value of leisure but lacks complementarities across hours.
Table 5 shows that this model, denoted as “Stable preferences”, can only generate about half of the dispersion in working
hours for both occupational groups, even though the dispersion in income is replicated exactly. It also does poorly on the
persistence of income and hours for workers, and hours of entrepreneurs. In line with this, Table 6 shows that the per
formance of this model in the distributional patterns is worse than both the benchmark and the “No complementarities”
model. Overall, this exercise conﬁrms the ﬁndings in studies of labor supply such as Erosa et al. (2016) regarding the
importance of value of leisure shocks in generating the observed variation in working hours. Accordingly, the results point at
the desire for ﬂexibility in hours as a factor in individuals' labor supply decisions.
6.3. Relevance for policy
The features discussed above are new in the models of occupational choice and they create a link between entrepre
neurship and various regulations, which we would not otherwise think of. Below are two examples as such: maximum
hours restrictions and income taxes.
Maximum workweek: Restrictions on the workweek usually have two motives: sustaining a better work life balance and
reducing unemployment.14 While the model in this paper is not built for unemployment analysis, it provides a good
laboratory to study the effects of this policy on workers' trade off between working time and leisure. The ﬁrst experiment
studies the implications of introducing an upper bound on workers' hours that is equal to a level 40 percent higher than the
average. Importantly, the policy change is not anticipated by the economy, and the computations capture the entire tran
sition to the new steady state.1514 Recent examples of the tightening of these restrictions include Chile in 2005, France starting 2000, Japan throughout the last three decades, and S.
Korea in 2004. For a survey of limits on the workweek, see Lee et al. (2007).
15 Qualitative implications of hours restrictions are the same if we deﬁne the upper bound as 20, 30 or 50 percent above the baseline mean for workers.
However, for a ceiling below 20 percent above the baseline mean, fraction of entrepreneurs increase as a result of this policy in the benchmark.
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Panel A: Maximumum hours
Panel B: Income tax
Fig. 4. Effects of imposing maximum hours (A) and income tax (B): transition and welfare. Note: Policy changes come as unanticipated shocks. “ΔHours”
gives the changes in average hours for each occupation group. Welfare gains are measured for each individual in the prereform steady state before the
beginning of the transition.Panel A of Fig. 4 shows that such a restriction in workers' hours actually does not lead to a decrease in the number of
workers in the benchmark. Instead, there is a slight decrease in the number of entrepreneurs. There are many entrepreneurs
that are in this occupation simply because their high value of leisure makes it too costly for them to work close to other
workers. Imposing maximum hours for workers makes salaried work a more attractive option for these individuals. As a
result, the number of entrepreneurs soon after the policy change is around 2 percent lower than the prereform level. In
contrast, workers in the model with no complementarities (ρ¼ 1) have volatile preferences but do not have a ﬂexibility
concern prereform. Hence, restricting hours at the top makes workers with a low value of leisure worse off without helping
others. This generates a 15 percent increase in the number of entrepreneurs in the steady state. In the second alternative
(σv ¼ 0), the variation in hours of workers is already low. Hence, the experimented upper bound does not affect the
equilibrium outcomes, including the selection into entrepreneurship.
Fig. 4 also shows the limited reduction in the average hours by workers for the benchmark, contrary to the large drop
predicted by the “No complementarities” model. For both models, the hours of entrepreneurs move in a fashion related to
the movement in hours of workers. In particular, workers that are willing to work long hours become entrepreneurs, and
this makes average hours worked by entrepreneurs increase. The output in the benchmark economy stays close to the
prereform level. The model without complementarities predicts a large drop in output due to the fall in hours and the
number of workers.
The welfare implications of the hours restrictions also vary across the modeling choices. In particular, Panel A of Fig. 4
shows that the median welfare loss following the announcement of the policy, in consumption equivalence units, is much14
smaller in the benchmark than it is in the alternative without complementarities. In the alternative without volatility in the
value of leisure, the policy does not bind, hence there are no welfare effects.
Income taxation: Income taxation can have similar effects to workweek restrictions, to the extent that it leads to a
reduction in working hours. The next example illustrates this by implementing a 10 percent additional labor earnings tax on
everyone.16,17
Panel B of Fig. 4 shows the negative effects of this experiment on workers' hours in all three models. This increases
wages, and the number of entrepreneurs decreases in all models. While this latter effect is similar for the benchmark to the
effects of the workweek restrictions, for the “No complementarities” model it contrasts with the large increase in the
number of entrepreneurs implied by the previous policy. The difference of the latter model is that it has richer entrepre
neurs, which gives an additional positive effect of the number of workers with stronger taxation.
The welfare gains from this change are qualitatively different from those implied by the workweek restrictions. Fig. 4
depicts that the median agent is roughly indifferent regarding this policy in the benchmark setting. In contrast, the “No
complementarities” alternative implies welfare losses for the median agent, though the qualitative implications are similar
in the alternative without volatility in the value of leisure to the benchmark.7. Conclusion
Entrepreneurs in the US, on average, earn less than comparable workers. This paper shows that a model allowing for a
ﬂexible hours motive for entrepreneurship, disciplined to replicate the discrepancies in the patterns of working hours
between entrepreneurs and workers, can generate this income differential with a margin similar to the one in the data.
The environment generalizes a standard entrepreneurship model in two ways. First, it features idiosyncratic shocks on
the value of leisure. This creates a desire for ﬂexible hours. Second, it introduces a labor aggregation technology in which
workers' hours are complementary to each other. This brings a form of inﬂexibility to salaried work and creates an addi
tional motive for being an entrepreneur. These help the model account for the low average income of entrepreneurs that is
observed in the data. Importantly, the model performs well also in the implied income and hours distributions for both
occupational groups.Acknowledgments
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